Multi-National Switzerland? A Comment on Ipperciel by Dardanelli, Paolo
Swiss Political Science Review
Volume 14 • Issue 3 • 2008 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft
Revue Suisse de Science Politique
Rivista Svizzera di Scienza Politica 3




© (2008) Swiss Political Science Review 14(3): 551–77
Debate: 
Communicative Nation and Multi-Nationalism
Multi-National Switzerland? 




Students of nationalism have long been attracted to Switzerland, whose 
peculiar features appear to defy some of the fundamental “laws” of nation-
ality. The traditional interpretation in the literature has been that Switzer-
land is an unusual mono-national state rather than a multi-national state. 
Donald Ipperciel’s article for this journal (2007) sets out to challenge this 
interpretation and to show that the country should be characterised as mul-
ti-national. In doing so he is among a number of authors, mainly working 
within the growing literature on multi-national democracy and multi-na-
tional federalism (Dardanelli 2009: 2). This note offers some reflections on 
his thesis and identifies a number of aspects which call for deeper analysis 
and debate within the scholarly community.
An Original Approach?
Ipperciel presents his argument as a refutation of the notion of a single 
Swiss nation, implying (p. 43) that the latter is mainly – or even only – de-
fended by the Swiss themselves. However, it is worth bearing in mind that 
1 I am indebted to Clive Church for bringing Ipperciel’s article to my attention and I am 
grateful to him and to François Grin for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
piece.
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this traditional interpretation has predominantly been shaped by non-Swiss 
scholars, some of them cited by Ipperciel himself.
Ipperciel starts from the premise that both objective and subjective ap-
proaches to the study of nations are unsatisfactory, the former because no 
single criterion can be found to be valid in all cases, the latter because it 
depends on volatile variables such as national identity. In response to this 
dichotomy, and the dilemma it generates, he proposes an approach includ-
ing both objective and subjective elements centred on the concept of com-
munication. While he acknowledges his intellectual debts to Habermas, he 
does not refer to the work of authors who have adopted a similar approach 
in the past and have even drawn similar conclusions to his. Just to cite a 
few examples, Deutsch (1966) developed long ago a theory of national-
ism centred on the concept of social communication, Anderson (1983) saw 
communication made possible by print-capitalism as the crucial spring-
board for the emergence of “imagined communities” while, more recently, 
Erk (2003) studied the role of language in the spheres of communication 
and education in Switzerland and concluded that the country had become 
multi-national.
Nations Defined by Communication and Sovereignty?
The central postulate in Ipperciel’s argument is that a nation is constituted 
and defined by communication among its members which creates a pub-
lic sphere and leads to the formation of a common will (esp. p. 40). Such 
“political discussion” is premised on, and revolves around, the notion of 
national sovereignty (pp. 40, 44, 62). In turn, for communication to take 
place, a single language must be present (p. 40). Ipperciel further states 
that it is the existence of communication per se which defines a nation 
rather than its contents (p. 61) but that the presence of communication is 
only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the existence of a nation 
(pp. 41–42).
Given its scope, this note cannot, of course, do justice to the question of 
the extent to which communication is essential to the emergence of a na-
tion. Suffice it here to say that there are clearly both compelling theoretical 
arguments and abundant empirical evidence to support such a notion but 
that it would be difficult to appreciate its role if we divorce the “container” 
from its “contents”. Even if we accept Ipperciel’s axioms in isolation, his 
postulate is inconsistent for it is vitiated by a double contradiction. Firstly, 
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if contents are irrelevant to the communicative constituting of a nation and 
can thus be ignored, how can we observe whether such communication 
revolves around the notion of national sovereignty? Ignoring contents logi-
cally leads to the impossibility to observe a national sovereignty discourse 
hence to the negation of one of the fundamental properties of a nation as 
understood by Ipperciel. Secondly, if contents are irrelevant and if it is the 
“fact of communication” that is decisive, then the presence or absence of 
communication does become a sufficient condition, not merely a necessary 
one, for the existence of a nation. A nation exists because there is commu-
nication, regardless of what that communication is about. Besides being 
intuitively implausible, this then violates the claim that communication 
is necessary but not sufficient to the existence of a nation. There are, of 
course, many examples of communities around the world in which there is 
plenty of communication and yet they are not nations. To mention Renan’s 
(1947: 893) famous example, the higher degree of communication and ho-
mogeneity existing in Tuscany compared to Switzerland clearly does not 
explain why the latter is a nation while the former is not. Likewise, the 
high degree of state-wide communication existing in Canada and Spain 
has not prevented them from becoming multi-national. Finally, by ignor-
ing contents Ipperciel negates his central aim of combining “objective” 
and “subjective” elements and is forced to resort to anecdotal “objective” 
elements alone to support his argument.
Ipperciel’s characterisation of communication itself is equally problem-
atic. He presents communication in dichotomous terms, either there is com-
munication or there is not (e.g. p. 61) and does not elaborate on how such 
understanding is formed and can be justified. Yet, this is a misrepresentation 
of reality since it is clear that communication exists in a continuous form. 
However we want to measure it, there are degrees of communication, not 
presence/absence. On the one hand, “perfect” or “total” communication 
is hardly possible for there is always a margin for misunderstanding and 
incommunicability even between the closest of people. On the other hand, 
even between people speaking totally mutually unintelligible languages, 
a degree of – non-verbal – communication has been shown to take place. 
A closer approximation of reality would be to say that there is a larger or 
smaller amount of communication within any given group of humans.
As public spheres are created by communication and the latter is con-
tinuous, it follows that the former should also be conceptualised as points 
on a continuum defined by higher or lower density of communication rath-
er than presence/absence. Furthermore, multiple public spheres usually 
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exist – some nested within each other, others overlapping to a greater or 
lesser extent with each other yet others largely unconnected – and citizens 
are typically involved in a number of them at the same time. The relevant 
question is not whether there is a public sphere or not, but how dense a 
given public sphere is compared to others. In order to operationalise the 
concept, a measure of such density thus needs to be devised and a “thresh-
old of significance” – i.e. when a public sphere is dense enough to sustain 
a national communication – should be identified.2 
Ipperciel’s claim that communication is only possible in the presence 
of a single language clearly derives from his dichotomous understanding 
of communication which suffers from the problems identified above. By 
reducing communication to the existence of a single language, he dis-
counts both people’s ability to speak – or at least to understand – a second 
or a third language and, more generally, the ability to communicate and 
circulate ideas across linguistic barriers. Passive knowledge of a second 
language – which is quite crucial in Switzerland, for instance – in particu-
lar, plays an important role in cross-language communication. Likewise, 
numerically small but socially and politically influential bi-lingual – either 
actively or passively – elites act as “transmission belts” and help commu-
nication to take place between people whose mother tongue is different. 
There is plenty of historical evidence, in primis from Swiss history itself, 
that communication across language barriers can be considerable.3 Rather 
than denying the existence of communication in multi-lingual contexts, it 
would thus be more fruitful to say that the density of the public sphere in 
a given community is likely to be a function of the ease of communication 
among its members. In turn, the latter is likely to be correlated to the extent 
to which the language/s in use in that community is/are widely spoken and 
understood.
No Swiss Nation in Historical and Constitutional Terms? 
Ipperciel argues that there was no notion of a Swiss nation when the mod-
ern federal state came into being in 1848 (p. 45) and that there is no notion 
of it either in constitutional practice today (p. 44). Both claims rely on a 
2 The need for measurement in order to study the role of social communication was already 
stressed by Deutsch (1966: esp. ch. 4). 
3 See, for instance, Zimmer (2003: 41–79).
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narrow reading of the letter of the constitution and miss important aspects 
of Swiss constitutionalism.
As regards the first claim, Ipperciel argues that art. 1 of the 1848 con-
stitution4 should be interpreted as indicating that, at the birth of modern 
Switzerland, the principle of nationality was set at the cantonal level. A 
different interpretation, however, has a lot to commend itself. As I have ar-
gued more extensively elsewhere (Dardanelli 2009: 11–12) there is a large 
body of evidence as well as authoritative scholarly opinion to the effect 
that the 1848 constitution was the product of a nationalist movement and 
the federal state was a creation of the Swiss people not of a compact be-
tween cantons. The anachronistic wording of the constitution should thus 
not be taken at its face value but should be understood as a pacification 
tactic in the aftermath of the dramatic confrontation between Radicals and 
Conservatives which preceded the drafting of the constitution. In a similar 
way, the fact that Switzerland is still officially called – in Latin, French, 
Italian and Romansch though not in German – a “confederation” does not 
mean that it is actually one.
Even more difficult to accept is his claim that sovereignty is assigned to 
the cantons rather than the people in the current constitution. The assertion 
is based on article 35 but fails to appreciate that this applies to the relations 
between the cantons and the federation only and that popular sovereignty 
is at the very heart not only of the substantive spirit of the constitution but 
also of actual constitutional practice, as embodied in the extensive provi-
sions for direct democracy. It is surprising, to say the least, to claim that 
there is no popular sovereignty in Switzerland when no other country in the 
world has gone to such lengths in giving practical meaning to this notion.
In a similar way, Ipperciel’s claim that the cantons are the true “nations” 
of Switzerland (p. 45) is difficult to square with the available empirical evi-
dence and is in tension with his conclusion, discussed below, that French 
speakers constitute a nation. Not only does Ipperciel not explain how the 
bi-lingual and tri-lingual cantons manage to be nations despite their lan-
guage diversity while the latter prevents the federation from being so, but 
he pushes his argument even further by arguing that a Swiss canton and 
4 “The peoples of the twenty-two sovereign cantons of Switzerland, united by the present 
alliance, i.e. Zurich [...] and Geneva, together form the Swiss Confederation”, author’s 
translation from the French. 
5 “The Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal 
Constitution; they exercise all rights which are not delegated to the Confederation”, au-
thor’s translation from the French. 
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France have virtually the same constitutional/national status (p. 46). This 
is because both are nations which have delegated some of their powers to 
a supra-national entity – Switzerland and the EU, respectively. In so doing, 
he overlooks the crucial fact that there is no evidence that Swiss citizens 
perceive their canton to be a nation (Dardanelli 2009: 21–23) while French 
citizens clearly perceive France to be so.
Lastly, his claim, based on Kymlicka, that Swiss patriotism is explained 
by the fact that the state acknowledges the national character of the lan-
guage communities (p. 63) is not empirically supported. Not only do the 
language communities not possess any institutional status of their own but 
they are not, and never have been, recognised as nations in Switzerland’s 
constitutional practice (Stojanovic 2000: 66; Dardanelli 2009: 20–21).
No State-wide National Communication in Switzerland? 
Ipperciel notes that the mass media landscape and the patterns of media 
usage in Switzerland are highly segmented by language. Assuming that 
Switzerland is subject to the same “logique communicationnelle” (p. 46) 
of the other nations, he then argues that there is no state-wide national 
communication in Switzerland but rather, as far as French speakers are 
concerned, a national communication at the level of the Suisse romande. 
With the disappearance of dialects and the growth of Suisse romande-wide 
media, a French-speaking public sphere emerged and with it a sense of a 
French-speaking identity. Although such an identity has not displaced the 
cantonal nations it is fuelling the emergence of a romande nation (p. 47).
Leaving aside the tension generated by the use of the term nation to 
refer to both cantons and language communities, it is certainly the case that 
media usage in Switzerland is heavily determined by language and that, 
as a result, the state-wide public sphere is rather segmented. Yet, while 
the starting point is broadly correct, the consequences Ipperciel derives 
from it are more questionable. There are four main problems with his ar-
gument. Firstly, in his eagerness to contrast Switzerland with France, Ip-
perciel overlooks the fundamental differences between the two countries. 
A decentralised federal state such as Switzerland, in which a great deal of 
political discussion and deliberation takes place at the cantonal and com-
munal level, surely needs a differently-structured public sphere to that of a 
still highly centralised unitary state such as France. The fact that the Swiss 
public sphere is much denser at regional and local level than at the state 
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level closely matches the constitutional structure of the country and the 
reality of its political life.6 Secondly, while the state-wide public sphere in 
Switzerland is clearly less dense than in France, it is certainly far from non 
existent. Even though most people use a single language in their daily life, 
active or passive knowledge of at least another language is widespread7, 
notably at the elite level, and such elites act as “transmission belts” for 
the circulation of ideas across the language divides. Reversing Ipperciel’s 
logic, the fact that political ideas, values and identities are largely similar 
across the language divides indicates that there is a sufficiently dense pub-
lic sphere to sustain a state-wide national communication.8 Thirdly, and 
crucially, the French-speaking public sphere – even according to Ipper-
ciel’s definition – is not a national public sphere because it is not in any 
sense structured by a focus on national sovereignty for French speakers. 
Among several other factors, this is also so because the dominant media 
outlets, most notably where television is concerned, that help to define the 
French-speaking public sphere in Switzerland are actually foreign ones, 
more specifically French. If Ipperciel’s logic were correct, i.e. that it is the 
“container” of communication rather than its “contents” that define na-
tions, we should then see the Suisse romande increasingly identifying itself 
as an irredenta portion of France rather than as a separate nation or a part 
of the Swiss nation. There are no signs so far, however, of this happening. 
Fourthly, despite the fact that Suisse romande-wide media have existed for 
over fifty years now, primary identification with the language community 
vis-à-vis primary identification with Switzerland as a whole has actually 
declined rather than risen.9
Divergence and malaise among French speakers? 
Ipperciel argues that the existence of two, largely disconnected public 
spheres explains the chasm between the language communities, the so-
called Röstigraben, and the political divergence between them. In turns this 
generates frustration and malaise among French speakers (pp. 52–59).
6 See also Grin (2002: 269).
7 See Grin (1999: 85–100).
8 See, among others, Schmid (1981: 150), Grin (2002: 279) and Kriesi and Trechsel (2008: 
20).
9 Compare Kerr (1974: 20–26) and Kriesi et al. (1996: 54–61).
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While Ipperciel is probably correct in identifying media segmentation 
as one of the factors contributing to the Röstigraben, his argument that 
this creates a politically significant malaise among the Suisse romands is 
largely unwarranted. To begin with, Ipperciel does not elaborate on his 
definition of malaise, does not attempt to measure it and does not put it into 
context. His “dependent variable” in this case appears simply to rest on the 
observation that several books dealing with such presumed malaise have 
recently been published (p. 55). Yet, if one delves a bit deeper into it and 
places it within a fairly basic cross-sectional and cross-temporal frame, it 
becomes clear that there is no politically significant malaise among French 
speakers. Firstly, while French speakers do think there is a fossé between 
the language communities, its political salience is very low (Kriesi et al. 
1996: 53–72). This is not unrelated to the fact that, in many respects, the 
Suisse romands are a numerical minority who are “punching well above 
their weight”.10 Secondly, lamentations as to the lack of knowledge and 
understanding between French and German speakers are as old as Switzer-
land yet have never been framed in terms of linguistic nationalism. Indeed, 
whatever malaise may exist today, it pales into insignificance compared to 
the situation during the First World War when tension between French and 
German speakers was at its peak.11 Thirdly, divergence in political behav-
iour between the language communities, as measured for instance in popu-
lar votations, has declined rather than increased over time and it is smaller 
than that created by other cleavages, notably the urban/rural one. Contrast, 
for example, the Landesring der Unabhängigen’s failure ever to establish 
itself in the Suisse romande (Gilg and Hablützel 1983: 259) with the Swiss 
People’s Party’s success in this decade which has seen it becoming the 
largest party in Vaud and Geneva (Dardanelli 2008). Last, but certainly not 
least, a degree of discontent and frustration in some sectors, either social or 
territorial, of the national community is quite simply a fact of life for most, 
if not all, countries in the world and is by no means confined to Switzer-
land. Should we take the malaise between the north and the south in Italy 
or between the Ile-de-France and the province in France as an indication 
that Italy and France are multi-national?
10 For instance, Schmid (1981: 85) found that both French and German speakers overesti-
mate the size of the French-speaking community.
11 In addition to the tensions generated by the war between France and Germany, between 
1913 and 1917 there was only one French speaker in the Federal Council and the main 
party, the Radicals, was split along linguistic lines, see Jost (1983: 124, 131).
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The Romands as a Nation That Dares Not Speak Its Name? 
Ipperciel does acknowledge that there is no romand nationalism at present 
and that this poses a problem for his thesis. His answer is to try and explain 
away this fact by arguing that it is the discourse of nationalism which is 
absent not its substance (p. 59). According to him, French speakers are 
afraid of using nationalist terminology but harbour nationalist aspirations, 
i.e. la nation romande is a “shy” but emerging nation.
However, this claim too is problematic when set against the empiri-
cal evidence. To begin with, it is not the case that French speakers are 
reluctant to use the terms “nation” and “national”. In fact, they are actu-
ally more likely to use them than the German speakers (Bendix 1992: 770; 
Stojanovic 2000: 66–67). It is rather that they use them with reference to 
Switzerland as a whole rather than to its French-speaking portion. Sec-
ondly, as mentioned above, primary identification with Switzerland vis-à-
vis primary identification with the Suisse romande among French speakers 
has grown not declined over time and a whole range of other cognitive and 
behavioural indicators confirm this trend (Dardanelli 2009: 19–21). Even 
at the height of the Jura crisis, no significant Suisse romande-wide nation-
alist discourse emerged. Hence, as already observed, the focus on national 
sovereignty – which, according to Ipperciel, defines nations – is totally 
absent in the political discourse of French speakers, ergo the latter cannot 
be characterised as a nation. Thirdly, there are powerful structural factors 
which militate against the nationalist mobilisation of French speakers for 
the foreseeable future (Dardanelli 2009: 24–27). That there are cultural dif-
ferences between French and German speakers and that some of these are 
politically salient is beyond dispute but that does not make nations of the 
respective language communities. Ipperciel’s neglect of the Italian-speak-
ing community is in this context a further limitation which prevents him 
from appreciating the true nature of linguistic identities in Switzerland. In 
the light of the above, his claim that “tout pointe vers ce phénomène” (p. 
60) cannot but puzzle the reader.
Conclusion
While Ipperciel’s focus on communication is a welcome contribution to 
the debate on nationalism, his operationalisation of the concept and its ap-
plication to Switzerland suffer from several sources of tension and weaken 
560 Paolo Dardanelli versus Donald Ipperciel
considerably the validity of his conclusions. To be a helpful framework to 
identify which human communities are nations and which are not and why 
certain communities have become nations while others have not, his thesis 
calls for a deeper theorisation of the concept of communication and the de-
velopment of a method to quantify it. Likewise, in applying the framework 
to Switzerland it is important to take fully into account the body of empiri-
cal evidence which points to the mono-national character of the country. 
Switzerland is certainly a crucial case for the study of nationalism and the 
greater the scholarly effort devoted to it so much greater the potential to 
deepen our understanding of the phenomenon and of its complex dynam-
ics.
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